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Abstract
In this paper we adopt a non linear approach to examine the dy-
namics of the international reserves holdings by the emerging economies.
To do so, we estimate the demand for international reserves with a
panel smooth transition model, that loosens two restricting hypothe-
ses, homogeneity and time-stability. We find evidence for the presence
of a non linear behavior in the demand for international reserves, a re-
sult that is new to the literature. The coefficients are found to change
smoothly, as a function of two threshold variables- out of seven candi-
dates tested in total. Our specification accounts for the acceleration of
foreign exchange reserves accumulation that the linear specifications
fail to explain.
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1 Introduction
It is important to understand the determinants of the demand for interna-
tional reserves by the emerging countries because their recent sharp accu-
mulation has distorted global balances. The supply of official savings from
emerging economies has more than offset the effect of the American current
account deficit and led to a fall in global interest rates (Bernanke, 2005).
Obviously the financial crisis has changed the picture. The surge in fiscal
deficits to restore growth in major developed countries will probably put an
upward pressure on long term interest rate. In this context, the pace of ac-
cumulation (or desaccumulation) of reserves will influence the pattern of the
new global monetary equilibrium in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
And yet, despite an abundant literature that originates in Heller (1966),
the different empirical works on international reserves holdings fail to explain
the following: global reserves have increased from 1 trillion US dollar in 1990
to 6 trillion in 2008, two third of this growth was driven by the emerging
countries where reserves have grown by more than 20% a year from 2003.
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of the demand for interna-
tional reserves with a panel smooth transition model (PSTR1) that has the
great advantage to allow parameters to vary across countries and time. In
sum we loosen two restricting assumptions of the existing empirical works
that may be responsible for their shortfall. To do so, we investigate the gen-
eral specification proposed by Aizenman and Lee (2007) who used a linear
homogeneous strategy to explain the demand for international reserves. We
construct the regression variables rigorously as they did and estimate the
model on 20 emerging countries during the 1980-2004 period.
The PSTR specification loosens homogeneity and time-stability hypothe-
ses and allows the parameters to change smoothly as a function of a threshold
variable. In the empirical part, we consider seven ”candidates” for the thresh-
old variable, four of which to test the standard distinction between mercan-
tilist and precautionary concerns (Aizenman and Lee, 2007). The mercantilist
concerns focuses on hoarding reserves to defend export competitiveness while
the precautionary literature considers the international reserves holdings as
a way to hedge against balance of payment instability. In addition we include
three threshold variables to test the indirect influence of the macroeconomic
1For other application of the PSTR specification, see Fouquau, Hurlin and Rabaud
(2008), Bessec and Fouquau (2008).
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conditions in the United States (US henceforth). This hypothesis stems from
the central role played by the US dollar in the current international monetary
system.
We find evidence for the presence of a non linear behavior in the demand
for international reserves, a result that is new to this literature. Additional
major results are the following: non-linearity is best rejected when the devi-
ation of the real exchange rate to its purchasing power parity value is used
as a threshold variable. This deviation is used as a proxy of the country’s
international price competitiveness, a key variable of the export-led growth
model that most emerging countries have adopted in the aftermath of the
Asian crisis. In turn, we find that the degree of capital account liberalization
is not a proper variable to account for non-linearity. In sum, we find that
the acceleration of international reserves accumulation in the merging coun-
tries stems from their adoption of export-led growth strategies rather than
from capital account liberalization.Our results thus support the mercantilist
rather than precautionary motives, contrary to Aizenman and Lee (2007).
Moreover our results highlight the influence of the US macroeconomic con-
text, a fact that complements the mercantilist view. The elasticity of most
determinants of the international reserves holdings increases along the de-
terioration of the US balance of payment and the subsequent slide of the
US dollar. Our results suggest that the recent surge in international reserves
in the emerging countries is a corollary of major US macroeconomic imbal-
ances. It contrasts sharply with the lead followed by Obstfled, Shambaugh
and Taylor (2008) who explain the recent surge in emerging economies by
precautionary motives to protect their economy against double drain defined
as followed: ”a combination of internal drains (runs from bank deposits to
currency) and external drains (flight to foreign currency or banks)”. In sum
their view suggests a proactive management of the foreign exchange reserves
along adequacy ratio. In turn our results support a passive accumulation
by central banks in the emerging economies, subject to the variation of an
exogenous variable, i.e. the US macroeconomic conditions.
Next session presents the linear specification that we use to introduce the
standard model, section 3 introduces the PSTR specification and section 4
explains the linearity and specification tests. In section 5 we present the data
and specification that we investigate and session 6 provides the results of the
estimation. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 Linear specification of international reserves
demand
The issue of the determinants of the demand for international reserves has
been abundantly debated in the literature and yet there is no consensus on
the question. They can be grouped into two broad categories, the mercan-
tilist and the precautionary motives (Aizenman and Lee, 2006). Along the
first argument, the countries hoard international reserves to limit the ap-
preciation of their currencies and maintain exports competitiveness (Dooley,
Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003). In turn, the mercantilist view focuses on
international reserves hoarding to get an insurance against unstable balance-
of-payment (Bird and Rajan, 2003).
We investigate the relationship of Aizenman and Lee (2007) who used a
linear homogeneous strategy to explain the demand for international reserves.
Later we will loosen these restricting hypotheses, homogeneity and time-
stability, and explain our motivations to provide a non-linear specification.
Aizenman and Lee (2007) compared the importance of precautionary versus
mercantilist motives in a single specification2 :
Resit = β0 + β1Popit + β2Openit + β3ER V olatit
+ β4EXGrowthit + β5PL. Devit + β6KAccit (1)
+ β7TOT it + β8CrisisDum+ ǫit
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , where N and T design the cross-section
and the time dimensions of the panel. In Eq (1), foreign reserves holdings
motivated by mercantilist concerns are positively correlated with higher ex-
port growth rate (EX Growth). In addition, if a country holds reserves to
manipulate its real exchange rate, the reserves are positively correlated to the
deviation of the real exchange rate to its PPP value (PL Deviation3). More
precisely, a country with a depreciated real exchange rate hoards reserves to
move its real exchange rate away from the PPP value. On the contrary, a
country with an over-appreciated exchange rate accumulates reserve to limit
the appreciation.
On the other hand, reserves holdings motivated by precautionary concerns
are positively correlated with the degree of capital account liberalization (K
2All variables are in log except Export growth.
3Defined as the fitted value from the regression of the national price levels to the relative
income- the PPP-based real per-capita income relative to the United States. We refer the
readers to Aizenman and Lee (2007) for more details on the computation of this variable.
4
Acc) and dummies that capture two important balance-of-payment crises,
the Mexican and Asian crises. The inclusion of dummies test wether emerg-
ing countries have built-up reserves in reaction to the past crises and get
protected against future crises.
The inclusion of Population is a scaling variable measure to capture the
size effect on international reserves holdings. Reserve holding is positively
correlated with the country’s population because they increase with the size
of international transactions. In addition, reserves accumulation is positively
correlated with the ratio of imports to GDP (Open) to account for the classic
argument according to which international reserves are held in proportion of
a number of months of imports so that they may substitute to exports re-
ceipts in case of a current account crisis (Heller, 1966, Frenkel, 1974). Greater
flexibility in the exchange rate (ER Volat) is negatively correlated with re-
serves holdings because it reduces the need for reserves. Last the terms of
trade (TOT) are positively correlated to reserves if countries absorb their
fluctuations through reserves holdings.
In this paper, we keep Aizenman and Lee (2007)’s specification and add
the log of the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP (Debt) as an ad-
ditional variable to Eq (1). Indeed the growth of capital markets and the
accrued liberalization of capital accounts have generated more balance-of-
payment instability (Bird and Rajan, 2003). Countries with a large stock
of short-term debt and an open capital account, accumulate international
reserves to smooth the adjustment process in case of sudden stops episodes.
In sum, countries accumulate international reserves to get extra liquidity in
the event of a crisis that isolates them from the international capital mar-
kets (Aizenman and Lee 2007) and triggers a domestic capital flight (De
Beaufort, Winjholds and Kapteyn, 2001, Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor,
2008). These last determinants have received considerable attention after
1999 when Pablo Guidotti and Alan Greenspan proposed to incorporate the
short-term foriegn-currency debt to determine the adequate ratio of inter-
national reserves (Greenspan, 1999). The estimated model is given by Eq
(2):
Resit = β0 + β1Popit + β2Openit + β3Debtit + β4EXGrowthit
+ β5PLDevit + β6KAccit + β7TOT it + ǫit (2)
In addition, we have dropped the exchange rate volatility because it is time-
constant4 and its impact is accounted for in the country-specific fixed effects
4ER Volatility is a standard deviation of the monthly percentage change in the exchange
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that we will insert in the estimation. Last Eq (2) excludes the crisis dum-
mies because they introduce the idea of non-linearity. However we use a more
general methodology to account for these effects or more sophisticated ones.
Indeed, according to Aizenman and Lee (2007)’s results, to remove the dum-
mies does not change the significance and value of the other estimators (see
Aizenman and Lee, 2007, Estimation IV in Table 2, p. 24).
We use eq (2) as a benchmark to check that the coefficients are consistent
with literature and so that in case we find non-linearity, this is not due to a
different sample5. Table 3 that reports the estimation’s results of the linear
specification confirms the consistence of our sample. Indeed the sign of all
coefficients is the same as in Aizenman and Lee (2007)6. As in hte literature
we find that debt does not explain international reserves. This result is com-
mon in linear estimations (Jeanne and Rancie`re, 2006) and is probably due
to the decrease in the ratio of external debt in most countries during the pe-
riod while the reserves holdings were increasing sharply. We will check in the
estimation part that this variable has a non-linear effect on the international
reserves.
Eq (2) has two major drawbacks. It assumes homogeneous and time-
constant coefficients across the N countries of the panel, i.e. βi,t = β, i =
1, ...N. It is indeed highly restricting and unrealistic to assume that, for in-
stance, all countries accumulate the same amount of international reserves in
proportion to their external debt while each country may have a different risk
aversion. Moreover, the rapid accumulation of international reserves in the
last decade suggests that the weight of estimators may have changed during
the period.
Generally, heterogeneity and time variability issues cannot be dealt with
at the same time. For instance, it is possible to consider a heterogeneous
panel model by assuming that the parameters βit are randomly distributed
(for a presentation of random coefficients models, see Hsiao and Pesaran,
2004). It implies that heterogeneity is the consequence of unspecified struc-
tural factors. In other words it is impossible to understand the factors of
rate against the dollar while the country-specific effects
5We use similar data and a slightly longer samplethan Aizenman and Lee (2007). They
are introduced in section 5.
6Contrary to Aizenman and Lee (2007) we expect the sign of PL dev to be positive
only but our interpretation is the same. It is because we keep unchanged the sign of the
residuals in the regression described in not 2 while they transform the serie by taking its
absolute value.
6
heterogeneity.
On the contrary, we assume that there are different factors that can ex-
plain the variability of the coefficients. For example, the degree of capital
account liberalization may change the elasticity between international re-
serves and the ratio of external debt to GDP. If reserve holdings are driven
by precautionary concerns, the elasticity between short term debt and inter-
national reserves should increase with the degree of capital openness, because
the more countries are open, the more vulnerable to sudden stop. We will ver-
ify this particular result related to the external debt in Section 4. This idea
clearly matches the definition of a threshold regression model: ”threshold
regression models specify that individual observations can be divided into
classes based on the value of an observable variable” (Hansen, 1999, page
346).
Our solution to circumvent these issues consists in introducing thresh-
old effects in a linear panel model. In this context, we use a Panel Smooth
Threshold Regression (PSTR) model proposed by Gonzalez et al. (2005).
The following section will introduce the specification that we investigate in
this paper.
3 Threshold Effects in International Reserves
Holdings
In this section we present the PSTR specification to explain the demand for
international reserves7:
Resit = αi + β0Xit + β1 Xit g(qit; γ, c) + ǫit (3)
for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , where N and T design the cross-section
and the time dimensions of the panel, to simplify the equation (3) Xit =
[popit, openit, debtit, growthit, P ldevit, KAccit, T otit, ] is the vector of explica-
tive variables ith country at time t. The residual ǫit is assumed to be
i.i.d. (0, σ2ε). To explain simply the mechanism of transition, let us consider
first a brutal transition (PTR model) as in Hansen (1999). In this case, the
7For other application of the PSTR specification, see Fouquau, Hurlin and Rabaud
(2008), Bessec and Fouquau (2008).
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function g(.) equals an indicator function:
g(qit; c) =
{
1
0
if qit ≥ c
otherwise
(4)
In this model, the transition mechanism between extreme regimes is very sim-
ple: at each date, if the threshold variable qit (example. the export growth)
observed for a given country is smaller than a given value, called the loca-
tion parameter c, the international reserves demand of the country is defined
by a particular model (or regime); this regime is different if the growth of
the exportations is larger than this location parameter. More precisely, the
coefficient of PL. Deviation is equal to β0 if export growth is smaller than c
and to β0 + β1 if export growth is larger. In our application, the coefficient
β0 associated with slow or negative export growth is expected to be null or
small and positive, whereas β0 + β1 prevailing in large exporter countries
should be positive and higher. Indeed, the large exporter countries associ-
ated with high export growth are likely to manipulate their real exchange
rate to support their export-led growth strategy. In this paper, we consider
seven ”candidates” for the threshold variable in order to test three different
hypotheses: the precautionary versus the mercantilist motives as well as the
US international position an explanation of the threshold effect.
However in the Eq (4) and (3) the PTR model imposes that the rela-
tionship can be divided into a (small) finite number of classes. Usually the
number of regimes is set to a maximum of 4, for computational aspects.
As common in the literature on threshold panel data, we circumvent
this issue in considering a logistic transition function (LPSTR model) which
allows the existence of an infinite number of regimes :
g(qit; γ, c) =
1
1 + exp [−γ(qit − c)]
, γ > 0 (5)
where c denotes a location parameter and parameter γ determines the slope
of the transition function. In the two cases, the transition function g(.) is a
continuous function bounded between 0 to 1. Figure depicts this transition
function for various values of the slope parameter γ.
The logistic function in (5) has a S-shape (Figure 1). It represents a
smooth transition from an inferior regime (with low export growth) to a
superior one (where the coefficient increases) with an infinite number of in-
termediate regimes in between. The γ parameter determines the smoothness
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i.e. the speed of the transition from one regime to the other one. When the
γ parameter tends to infinity, the transition function g(qit; γ, c) tends to the
indicator function (equation 4) and thus the LPSTR model corresponds to
the PTR model. In contrast, when γ tends to zero, the transition function
g(qit; γ, c) is constant and the model reduces to the standard linear model
with individual effects (the so-called ”within” model).
The PSTR model has the great advantage to allow parameters to vary
across time and countries given the threshold variable. More precisely, the
coefficient is defined as a weighted average of the parameters β0 and β1:
eit =
δResit
δXit
= β0 + β1 g(qit; γ, c) (6)
Consequently, this specification allows for an evaluation of the influence of
variables Xit on the demand for international reserves according to the level
of qit. There is a caveat the reader should be aware of: the coefficient in a
PSTR model can be different from the estimated parameters defined in the
extreme regimes, i.e. the parameters β0 and β0+β1, as illustrated by equation
(6). It is preferable to interpret the sign of these parameters, which indicates
(i) an increase or a decrease in the estimator depending on the value of the
threshold variable (e.g. export growth) and (ii) the varying coefficient in the
time and individual dimensions given by equation (6).
The PSTR model can be generalized to r+1 extreme regimes as follows:
Resit = αi + β0Xit +
r∑
j=1
βjXit gj(qit; γj, cj) + ǫit (7)
where the r transition functions gj(qit; γj, cj) depend on the slope parameters
γj and on location parameters cj . In this generalization, if the threshold
variable qit is different from Sit, the coefficient for the i
th country at time t
is defined by the weighted average of the r + 1 parameters βj associated to
the r + 1 extreme regimes:
eit =
δResit
δXit
= β0 +
r∑
j=1
βj gj(qit; γj, cj) (8)
In total, this specification takes into account the estimators heterogene-
ity and time-instability. This is because we allow the estimator to depend
on exogenous variables, i.e. the threshold variable. To our knowledge, this
econometric procedure is novel in its application to international reserves
determinants studies. Next session introduces the linearity test and the se-
quential procedure to identify the number of regimes.
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4 Estimation and specification tests
The estimation of the PSTR model consists of several stages. In the first step,
a linearity test is applied and the threshold specification with one transition
function is estimated. Then, if the linear specification is rejected, the opti-
mal number of transition functions is determined by conducting tests of no
remaining non-linearity. Regardless of the choice of the transition function,
the estimation of the parameters of the PSTR model requires eliminating the
individual effects αi by removing individual-specific means and then applying
non linear least squares to the transformed model (see Gonza`lez et al., 2005
or Colletaz and Hurlin, 2006 for more details).
Following the procedure of Gonza`lez et al. (2005), testing the linearity
in a PSTR model (equation 3) can be done by testing H0 : γ = 0 or H0 :
β0 = β1. In both cases, the test is non standard since the PSTR model
contains unidentified nuisance parameters under H0 (Davies, 1987). This
issue is well known in the literature devoted to time series threshold models.
A possible solution is to replace the transition function g(qit; γ, c) by its first-
order Taylor expansion around γ = 0 and to test an equivalent hypothesis in
an auxiliary regression. We then obtain:
Resit = αi + θ0 Xit + θ1 Xit qit + ǫ
∗
it (9)
In these auxiliary regressions, parameters θ1 and θ2 are proportional to the
slope parameter γ of the transition function. Thus, testing the linearity
against the PSTR simply consists in testing H0 : θ1 = 0 in (9) for a logistic
function. If SSR0 denotes the panel sum of squared residuals under H0, i.e.
in the linear panel model with individual effects and SSR1 the panel sum of
squared residuals under H1, i.e. in the transformed PSTR model with two
regimes, the corresponding LM statistic is then defined by:
LMF = (SSR0 − SSR1)/ [SSR0/(TN −N − 1)] (10)
Under the null hypothesis, the F-statistic has an approximate F (1, TN −
N−1) distribution. The logic is similar when it comes to testing the number
of transition functions in the model or equivalently the number of extreme
regimes. The idea is as follows: we use a sequential approach by testing the
null hypothesis of no remaining nonlinearity in the transition function.
For instance let us assume that we have rejected the linearity hypothesis.
The second step is then to test whether there is one transition function (H0 :
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r = 1) or whether there are at least two transition functions (H0 : r = 2).
Recall that a model with r = 2 is defined as:
Resit = αi + β0Xit + β1 Xit g1(qit; γ1, c1) + β2Xit g2(qit; γ2, c2) + ǫit (11)
The testing procedure consists in replacing the second transition func-
tion by its first-order Taylor expansion around γ2 = 0 and testing linear
constraints on the parameters. If we use the first-order Taylor approxima-
tion of g2(qit; γ2, c2), the model becomes:
Resit = αi + β0Xit + β1 Xit g1(qit; γ1, c1) + θ1 Xit qit + ǫ
∗
it (12)
and the test of no remaining nonlinearity is simply defined by H0 : θ1 = 0.
Let us denote SSR0 the panel sum of squared residuals under H0, i.e. in a
PSTR model with one transition function. Let us denote SSR1 the sum of
squared residuals of the transformed model (equation 12). As in the previous
examples, the F-statistic LMf can be calculated in the same way by adjusting
the number of degrees of freedom. The testing procedure is then as follows.
Given a PSTR model with r = r∗, we test the null H0 : r = r
∗ against
H1 : r = r
∗ + 1. If H0 is not rejected the procedure ends. Otherwise,
the null hypothesis H0 : r = r
∗ + 1 is tested against H1 : r = r
∗ + 2.
The testing procedure continues until the first acceptance of H0. Given the
sequential aspect of this testing procedure, at each step of the procedure the
significance level must be reduced by a constant factor 0 < ρ < 1 in order to
avoid excessively large models. We assume ρ = 0.5 as suggested by Gonza`lez
et al. (2005).
Next session presents data and the results of linearity and specification
tests.
5 Data and specification results
The estimation is based on a unbalanced panel of 20 emerging countries8 dur-
ing the 1980-2004 period. The sources of the data are the World Development
Indicators (WDI) and Penn World. We constructed the regression variables
rigorously as Aizenman and Lee (2007) except for the index of capital ac-
count openness constructed by Edwards (2005). Instead we use the publicly
8The primary sample included 24 emerging countries to be consistent with the esti-
mation of Aizenman and Lee (2007). However we dropped 4 countries for a lack of data.
They are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Venezuela, Algeria, China,
Egypt, India, and Morocco.
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and longer spanned index proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006). The
definitions of the data are reproduced in the appendix. We added the log
of short-term external debt to GDP ratio (WDI database) as an additional
explanatory variable to their model.
The last step but not least before estimating a PSTR model is to identify
the threshold variables in order to capture model’s non-linearity. Recall that
PSTR specification of the demand for international reserves is the following:
Resit = αi + β0Xit + β1 Xit g(qit; γ, c) + ǫit (13)
We consider seven ”candidates” for the threshold variable qit. The first
group of variables includes domestic variables, the second, US macroeco-
nomic variables. This is to test whether the central banks in the emerging
countries are influenced by the domestic macroeconomic context and/or the
US context when they decide to accumulate international reserves.
In the domestic variables, we test which variable may influence the central
bank decision by keeping the standard distinction between mercantilist and
precautionary concerns. That is, we examine the influence of export growth
and price level deviation (PL. dev) on the one hand, and capital account
liberalization and debt on the other hand It is important to note that we will
focus on the effect of the threshold variable on four determinants, i.e. capital
account, debt, export growth and the PL. deviation. The threshold effect
is expected to be null or marginal on the control variables, i.e. population,
openness and terms of trade.
In model I, we will test the influence of PL. dev as a threshold variable.
This is the most complex transition mechanism. Precisely, we will assess the
influence of the exchange rate misalignment (the distance to PPP value) on
mercantilist behavior. We expect the countries with highly over-appreciated
exchange rate to compensate export growth by holding more reserves than
countries close to their PPP value (the elasticity between reserves and export
growth should increase ). This is because, according to the mercantilist view,
the central bank with over-appreciated exchange rate intervene on the ex-
change rate market to slow down their currency appreciation. The contrary
holds for countries with under-appreciated exchange rate: we expect the
countries with under-appreciated exchange rate to accumulate less reserves
when the exchange rate is far from the PPP value (the elasticity between
reserves and export growth should decrease). This is because countries with
under-appreciated exchange rate wish to keep it away from the PPP value
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by hoarding international reserves. In sum, if the mercantilist view holds,
we should find three regimes with a sharp transition as in a PTR model a`
la Hansen (1999). Indeed when PL. Dev is negative (below the PPP value)
and small, the elasticity between reserves and export growth is small (first
regime). It increases along with PL. dev (second regime). When PL. dev gets
positive value (i.e. the exchange rate is over-appreciated) countries compen-
sate even more export growth by hoarding reserves.
In model II, we will test the influence of export growth as a threshold
variable. It is expected to influence the elasticity between international re-
serves and PL. dev. As a matter of fact, the largest exporter countries are
the most likely to follow an export-led growth strategy. According to the
mercantilist view, large exporters intervene on the foreign exchange (forex)
market to limit the appreciation of their currency and defend their export
competitiveness. Therefore the elasticity between international reserves and
PL. dev should increase along the export growth.
In model III, we will test the influence of the degree of capital account
openness as a threshold variable. In particular, we will measure its impact
on the proportion of international reserves accumulated to hedge the exter-
nal debt against external shocks. The more open the capital account, the
more countries are vulnerable to capital flight episodes. Therefore according
to the precautionary literature, liberalized countries should accumulate more
reserves in proportion of their external debt than closed countries (the elas-
ticity between international reserves and debt should increase along capital
account). In addition we expect the threshold variable to influence its own
elasticity (the elasticity between international reserves and capital account
should increase along capital account).
In model IV that includes debt as a threshold variable, we test differently
a similar idea. We measure the influence of the level of the external debt on
the elasticity between international reserves and capital account. Accord-
ing to the precautionary view, largely indebted countries are expected to be
more sensitive to their vulnerability to capital flight episodes (the elastic-
ity between international reserves and capital account should increase along
debt). In addition largely indebted countries should build up international
reserves with their export receipts (the elasticity between international re-
serves and export should increase along debt).
In model V to VII, we test the influence of the macroeconomic conditions
in the United States (US henceforth) as a threshold variable. Three vari-
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ables capture the international position of the US and are used to test the
same common idea. It stems from the central role played by the US dollar
in the current international monetary system. As it has been observed, the
accumulation of reserves by the emerging countries has recently offset the
American deficit and limited the depreciation of the US dollar. We can check
if it was done along sheer mercantilist concerns, namely to defend the peg.
To do so, we examine the effect of the US macro variables on the elasticity
between international reserves and export growth. For example, in model V,
that includes the current account position of the United States, we expect
that the larger the US current account deficit, the more the central banks in
emerging countries accumulate international reserves to limit their currency
appreciation (i.e. the US dollar depreciation) and maintain their competi-
tiveness.
The US macroeconomic context may also influence the elasticity between
international reserves and debt. The worse the international position of the
United States, i.e., the more they absorb international savings to finance their
deficits, the less the emerging countries can borrow money on the interna-
tional capital market. Therefore the elasticity between international reserves
and debt should decrease along with the deterioration of the US international
position. We test alternatively the current account balance (as a proportion
of GDP), the savings (as a proportion of GDP) and the US real interest rate
to capture the international position of the US9. The choice of the savings
rate is justified by the textbook relationship between national savings and
current account balance. The relationship between the real interest rate and
the current account balance is understood in a model linking the money mar-
ket and the exchange rate market10. The international position of the United
States deteriorates when the current account balance deteriorates (US macro
1 decreases), the savings rate rate (US macro 2) decreases and the real in-
terest rate (US macro 3) decreases. Last it is the right place to mention that
these threshold variables do not depend on individuals (qit = qt). This allows
to take into account only non-linearity and time-instability but not hetero-
geneity across the countries.
9In the literature, the US real interest rate is usually introduced to measure the effect
of opportunity costs of holding international reserves. However it would not be relevant to
interpret this threshold variable as an opportunity cost because a threshold effect has only
indirect effects on the coefficient of the explanatory variables. Basically, the opportunity
cost has no expected effect on the elasticity between international reserves and export
growth, K account or debt.
10See for example Krugmman and Obstfeld, International Economics, Ed 11th, 2008.
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For each model, the first step is to test the linear specification of interna-
tional reserve holdings against a specification with threshold effects. If the
linearity hypothesis is rejected, the second step will determine the number
of transition functions required to capture non-linearity. The results of these
tests are reported in Table 2. For each specification, the LM statistics for
the linearity tests (H0: r = 0 versus H1: r = 1) and for the no remaining
non-linearity tests (H0: r = a versus H1: r = a + 1) are computed (see
section 3 for a detailed explanation of the specification tests). The values of
the statistics are reported up to the first non rejection of H0.
The linearity tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of a linear relation-
ship whichever threshold variable is included in the specification. This result
is very important because it highlights the presence of a non linear behavior
in the demand of international reserve for the first time to our knowledge.
The strongest rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity is obtained with
PL. deviation. With a view of selecting a particular model among the seven
proposed, the “optimal” model would thus be model I. Indeed, as suggested
by Gonza`lez et al. (2005), the ”optimal” threshold variable corresponds to
the variable which leads to the strongest rejection of the linearity hypothesis.
The novel idea of this paper was to test the indirect influence of the
US macroeconomic conditions on the demand for international reserves by
emerging economies. Our results confirm this hypothesis because the three
US macro threshold variables do reject linearity with a LM statistics value be-
tween 20, 3 and 41, 5. We observe that according to the LM statistics, model
II and III (export growth and capital account openness) reject linearity less
than models V to VII (US macro variables). In sum, the US macroeconomic
context is statistically better than the degree of capital liberalization and the
export growth to account for non-linearity in the demand for international
reserves.
The specification tests of no remaining non-linearity lead to the identifi-
cation of an optimal number of transition functions. In most cases, only one
transition function is necessary, excepted for export growth and debt which
needs two and three functions respectively. In other words, a small number
of extreme regimes is sufficient to capture non-linearity in the relationships.
And the less extreme regimes, the less estimators to identify. In the mean-
while, recall that a smooth transition model, even with two extreme regimes
(r = 1), can be viewed as a model with an infinite number of intermediate
regimes. The coefficients are defined at each date and for each country as
weighted averages of the values obtained in the two extreme regimes. The
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weights depend on the value of the transition function. So, even if r = 1, this
model allows a “continuum”of coefficient values (or regimes), each one as-
sociated with a different value of the transition function g(.) between 0 and 1.
In sum we obtain a parsimonious estimation that takes into account
as exhaustively as possible non-linearity and/ or heterogeneity and time-
instability. In the next session, we present and comment the estimations
results.
6 Non-linear results of international reserves
holdings
The coefficients are defined at each date and for each country as weighted
averages of the values obtained in the two extreme regimes. Therefore, as
mentioned in section II, the coefficients in a PSTR model can be different
from the estimated parameters defined in the extreme regimes, i.e. the pa-
rameters β0 and β0+ β1 in equation (6). So for each model we first interpret
the sign of parameter β1, which indicates an increase (β1 > 0) or a decrease
(β1 < 0) in the estimator along the increase in the threshold variable. In a
second step, we will plot the evolution of each estimator to properly interpret
the variation of the coefficient along the threshold variable.
The effect of the threshold variable on four determinants, PL. deviation,
export growth, capital account and debt is reported for each model in table
1. In models I, III, V to VII, we found one transition function only (r = 1)
so we can easily interpret the effect just as explained previously. Table 1
does not report the results for models II and IV because r = 2 and r = 3
respectively. We need the graph to analyze the effects because with more
than one transition, we do not know the shape of the transition function (it
is no longer an S-shape function).
The results of model I confirm the economic mechanisms described in
the previous section. On the one hand, the elasticity between international
reserves and export growth increases along PL. dev. More precisely, the fur-
thest the real exchange rate is from its PPP value, the more the central
banks compensate the appreciation of their currency The graphical analysis
will allow us to confirm or infirm the scenario with three regimes assumed
in the previous section. Note that as expected PL. dev has no impact on the
16
Table 1: Impact of increase in the threshold variable on the coefficient
Model I Model III Model V Model VI Model VII
PL. dev K Account US macro 1 US macro 2 US macro 3
PL. dev no effect no effect no effect no effect no effect
Export Growth ր ր ց ց ց
K Account no effect ր ց ց ց
Debt no effect ց ր ր ր
other estimators.
In turn, model III does not support the precautionary hypothesis ac-
cording to which, financially liberalized countries should accumulate more
reserves in proportion of their external debt than financially closed coun-
tries. On the contrary, we find that the estimator of debt decreases, i.e. debt
explains less international reserves. It is probably not due to the effect of
capital account but to a time-effect. Indeed the ratio of external debt has de-
creased in most countries during the period, so does its elasticity. The result
that debt does not explain international reserves is common in linear estima-
tions (Jeanne and Rancie`re, 2006). However the elasticity between reserves
and export growth increases along the openness of the capital account. The
more financially open, the more countries tend to compensate growing trade
and limit their currency appreciation by accumulating reserves.
In model V to VII, note that the three US variables have a similar effect as
threshold variables. The expected effect of the US macroeconomic conditions
on the estimators of export growth and debt is confirmed. Again the better
the US international position, the less the central banks compensate the ap-
preciation of their currency (the lower the elasticity between international
reserves and export growth). The contrary holds in the elasticity between
international reserves and debt. The better the international position of the
United States (the higher US macro 1), the more the emerging countries
borrow money on the international capital market, and so the more the debt
explains international reserves. During the period obviously, the international
position of the United States has deteriorated. So the same reasoning holds
but the reader should interpret the table with a decreasing trend if she wants
to understand the historical evolution.
In total, a first analysis of the sign of β1 confirms the expected influence
of the real exchange misalignment and of the US macroeconomic variables on
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the determinants of the demand for foreign exchange reserves. The graphical
analysis will provide additional information on the patterns of the transition
to propose simple extrapolations.
Figure 2 and 3 plot the value of the coefficients given the theoretical val-
ues11 of the threshold variable in each model. We also refer the reader to
table 3 and 4 that report the coefficients value in extreme regimes and in the
benchmark linear model. Table 3 confirms the estimations robustness as in
most cases, the value of the coefficient in the linear estimation is closed to
the coefficient of the first regime’s non-linear model.
In model I, the graphical analysis confirms the scenario with three regimes
assumed in the previous section between international reserves and export
growth. As a matter of fact, the smooth transition allows that the coeffi-
cient increases when the threshold variable is close and inferior to zero and
accelerates thereafter. It means that the elasticity increases smoothly from
0, 01 to 0, 9 in an infinite number of intermediate regimes. At the threshold
value, c = 0, 26 the coefficient is β0+β1
2
= 0, 45. Economically, it means that
countries with slightly under-appreciated (negative and close to 0) exchange
rate have a higher coefficient than countries with highly under-depreciated
(negative and far from 0) exchange rate. In sum, countries manipulate more
their exchange rate when they have an under-appreciated exchange rate that
is close to the PPP value than when it is already far from it. In turn, countries
with slightly over-appreciated (positive and close to zero) exchange rate have
a lower coefficient than countries with highly over-appreciated exchange rate.
The same graph plots the individual value of the coefficient in 2003 for four
countries, Brazil, China, Hungary and Morocco. Three countries were indeed
under-appreciated and are found in the lower part of the function while Mo-
rocco has the only over-appreciated currency and is found on the upper-part
of the function. Note that the Chinese currency, RMB has appreciated since
the People Bank of China People granted a greater flexibility to the exchange
rate regime in July 2005, a date that is not included in the sample. Accord-
ing to our results, China should have moved upward along the curve since
2005 implying a higher coefficient between reserves and export growth. It
suggests that the surge in the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in
China stems from greater interventions on the forex market to compensate
the growing trade.
11The theoretical value corresponds to the range between the min and max values of
the threshold variable. In practice, there may not be points along the entire transition
function. However we found in all estimations that there is no cluster of points and that
they are well distributed along the function.
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In model II with export growth as a threshold variable, the transition
functions are sharp. The coefficients of export growth, capital account and
debt are impacted by the variation of export growth. Interestingly, the coeffi-
cient of export growth increases suddenly from −0, 01 to 0, 036 when export
growth gets higher than −0, 8%. The threshold value of −0, 8 is small and
close to 0 which may be interpreted as followed: as soon as export growth
gets positive, countries accumulate more reserves to defend their compet-
itiveness. In turn, the elasticity between reserves and capital account and
debt decreases slightly from 0, 8 to 0, 51 and from 005 to -0,02 respectively
when export growth crosses a higher threshold of 5%. The decrease in both
coefficients suggests that central banks take less precautionary concerns into
account in countries with an export-led growth strategy. Note that Brazil,
China, Hungary and Morocco are all located on the second extreme regimes
in 2003, as are all countries in our sample actually. The fact that transition
is sharp suggests that higher export growth would not change the coefficients
value. Therefore the acceleration of reserves holdings in the emerging coun-
tries can not be accounted for by an acceleration of export growth.
In model III with capital account as a threshold variable, the transition
function is sharp. The elasticity between international reserves and export
growth increases sharply from −0, 08 to 0, 016 and the threshold value is
0, 3612. Note that this threshold value is very low and corresponds to fi-
nancially close countries such as was China and Peru until 1989 and 1990
respectively. Since then, all countries in our sample are located on the higher
regime, implying that their elasticity has been stable over the period. So cap-
ital openness cannot explain the increasing trend of reserves accumulation
in the period. After the low statistics value of linearity test, it is a second
evidence that rejects capital account as a proper variable to account for non-
linearity during the period. Again it tends to mitigate the importance of
precautionary arguments.
In model IV, debt as a threshold variable has an effect only on its own
coefficient. The higher the debt, the higher the coefficient but it tends to
zero. We find again the same result as in linear estimations, that debt does
not explain international reserves holdings.
Last, as mentioned above, the three US macroeconomic variables have a
similar effect as threshold variables. The graphical analysis focuses on the
12c = −1, 01 i.e the threshold is 0,36 because the variable is in log.
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one that rejects best non-linearity, i.e. the saving rate. We will also briefly
comment model VII because the smooth transition allows to extrapolate the
coefficients evolution. Note tat the construction of the threshold variables
does not allow to take into account heterogeneity between countries so the
graph plots the value of the coefficients for four different years, 1980, 1991,
2000 and 2003 and not different countries as was the case above. In model
VI, when the US saving rate drops below the threshold value 18, 8%, the
elasticities between international reserves and export growth and capital ac-
count increase. In turn, the elasticity between international reserves and debt
decrease. Note that the saving rate stayed above the threshold value only un-
til the beginning of the eighties. So during the majority of the period, the
elasticities have kept the second regime’s value. Model VI can not explain
the acceleration in the foreign exchange reserves after the eighties. In turn
the graphical analysis of model VII reveals that the elasticity between inter-
national reserves and capital account or export growth increases smoothly
along the decrease in the US real interest rate. Elasticities have increased
from 0,6 and 0,015 in 1991 to 0,85 and 0,025 in 2003 respectively. The sharp
decrease in the US real interest rates from 2000 explains the acceleration of
international reserves accumulation during the period.
In total, the position of the exchange rate relatively to its PPP value and
the US real interest rate are particularly relevant to explain non-linearity in
the demand for international reserves in the emerging countries. The varia-
tion of both variables trigger a smooth change in the pace and patterns of
reserves holdings. It suggests that central banks in emerging countries accu-
mulate foreign reserves primary to offset the variation the US$to defend a
final objective of price competitiveness. Obviously it is because most of them
have adopted an export-led growth strategy in the aftermath of the Asian
crisis. It suggests that the management of foreign reserves is subject to an
exogenous variable, i.e. the US dollar. It is different from the precaution-
ary view which considers reserves holdings as a proactive way to protect the
country against financial flows instability.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we adopted a non linear approach to examine the dynamics of
the international reserves holdings by the emerging economies. To do so we
estimated the demand for international reserves with a PSTR specification,
that loosens two restricting hypotheses, homogeneity and time-stability. We
found evidence for the presence of a non linear behavior in the demand for
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international reserves, a result that is new to this literature. After testing
seven candidates for the threshold variable, we identified two threshold vari-
ables that may explain properly the acceleration of foreign exchange reserves
accumulation described in the introduction. They are the misalignment of
the real exchange rate and the level of the US real interest rate. In total,
these results support the mercantilist view and mitigate the importance of
precautionary concerns. As noted in the introduction, the US real interest
rate is expected to increase in the aftermath of the crisis. Our results suggest
that it should trigger a significative slow down of the international reserves
accumulation.
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Data Appendix: Definitions of the regression
variables
The sources of the data are the World Development Indicators (WDI) and
Penn World.
• Reserves: international reserves holdings minus gold, measured in U.S.
dollars.
• Res: ratio of reserves to the dollar value of nominal GDP, in percent.
• Population: log of population
• Openness: log of percent import share
• EX Growth: three-year moving average of the growth rate of real ex-
ports, lagged two years in the regression.
• Income: log of per-capita real GDP, PPP based.
• Relative Income: Income of each country relative to that of the United
States.
• Price Level: national price levels (measured in U.S. dollars), obtained
from the Penn World Table.
• PL. Deviation: residual from the regression of Price Level on Relative
Income.
• K Account: Index of capital account liberalization, constructed by Lane
and Milese-Ferretti (2006)13
13We did not use the index used in Aizenman and Lee (2007) because it is not publicly
available. Instead we use the publicly and longer spanned index proposed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferreti (2006).
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• ToT: log of the net barter terms of trade index.
Regressions include country-specific constant terms. The primary sample
include 20 emerging countries. They are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Al-
geria, China, Croatia, Egypt, India, and Morocco.
Source: Aizenman and Lee (2007), Data Appendix, p. 22.
Tables and figures
Table 2: LMf Tests for Remaining Nonlinearity
Model Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Threshold Variable Pl deviation K account Ex Growth Debt
H0 : r = 0 vs H1 : r = 1 60.8
(0.00)
18.4
(0.01)
18.1
(0.01)
41.4
(0.00)
H0 : r = 1 vs H1 : r = 2 15.2
(0.04)
8.48
(0.30)
30.1
(0.00)
26.4
(0.00)
H0 : r = 2 vs H1 : r = 3 - - 13.4
(0.06)
22.9
(0.06)
H0 : r = 3 vs H1 : r = 4 - - - 13.8
(0.05)
Model Model V Model VI Model VII
Threshold Variable U.S Macro 1 U.S Macro 2 U.S Macro 3
H0 : r = 0 vs H1 : r = 1 20.4
(0.00)
41.5
(0.00)
20.6
(0.00)
H0 : r = 1 vs H1 : r = 2 15.2
(0.04)
12.0
(0.10)
12.2
(0.09)
H0 : r = 2 vs H1 : r = 3 - - -
Notes: US Macro 1 denotes . For each model (i.e. for each threshold variable), the testing procedure works as follows. First,
test a linear model (r = 0) against a model with one threhosld (r = 1). If the null hypothesis is rejected, test the single
threshold model against a double threshold model (r = 2). The procedure is continued until the hypothesis no additional
threhold is not rejected. The corresponding LMF statistic has an asymptotic F [1, TN −N − (r+1)] distribution under H0.
The corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Parameter estimates for the final PSTR
Specification Linear Model Model I Model II
Threshold Var. none Pl deviation K account
Parameter β0 β1 β0 β1 β0 β1
Pop. 2.00
(7.59)
- 1.69
(6.12)
−0.39
(−2.68)
1.68
(5.26)
0.2
(1.77)
Open 0.29
(2.37)
- 0.34
(2.77)
−0.07
(−0.25)
0.72
(1.97)
−0.48
(−1.28)
Debt −0.02
(−4.54)
- −0.03
(−6.31)
−0.03
(−1.11)
0.12
(1.78)
−0.15
(−2.22)
EX Growth 0.01
(3.95)
- 0.01
(2.12)
0.08
(4.23)
−0.07
(−1.96)
0.09
(2.35)
Pl Deviation 0.49
(1.88)
- −1.38
(−2.98)
1.24
(0.8)
1.05
(0.43)
−0.61
(−0.24)
K account 0.61
(6.07)
- 0.67
(8.73)
0.19
(0.51)
−2.21
(−3.66)
3.04
(5.02)
TOT 0.3
(2.65)
- 0.2
(1.71)
1.75
(3.18)
0.14
(0.36)
0.26
(0.61)
Location parameter c - 0.26 -1.01
Slope parameter γ - 18.1 23.7
Schwartz Criterion - -1.42 -1.49
Specification Model V Model VI Model VII
Threshold Var. US Macro 1 US Macro 2 US Macro 3
Parameter β0 β1 β0 β1 β0 β1
Pop. 2.27
(7.53)
0
(−0.06)
2.32
(7.16)
0.04
(0.79)
1.87
(6.45)
0.14
(1.43)
Open 0.19
(1.59)
0.44
(2.26)
0.15
(1.18)
0.1
(0.5)
0.22
(1.76)
0.29
(0.8)
Debt −0.03
(−6.18)
0.05
(3)
−0.03
(−6.25)
0.05
(3.63)
−0.04
(−4.44)
0.08
(2.24)
EX Growth 0.01
(3.81)
−0.02
(−1.66)
0.01
(4.03)
−0.03
(−1.96)
0.03
(3.92)
−0.06
(−1.93)
Pl Deviation 0.47
(1.69)
0.57
(0.83)
0.72
(2.56)
−0.17
(−0.24)
0.85
(2.14)
−1.72
(−1.24)
K account 0.75
(8.81)
−0.71
(−2.72)
0.84
(9.92)
−0.77
(−2.32)
0.87
(6.72)
−1.35
(−3.17)
TOT 0.32
(2.41)
−0.3
(−1.65)
0.29
(1.99)
−0.26
(−1.2)
0.5
(3.19)
−0.89
(−2)
Location parameter c -0.56 18.8 8.66
Slope parameter γ 11.4 9.72 0.73
Schwartz Criterion -1.33 -1.37 -1.32
Notes: The T-statistique in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Linear model is estimated with
individual fixed effetcs. For each transition function, the estimated location parameters c and the corre-
sponding estimated slope parameter γ are reported. The PSTR parameters can not be directly interpreted
as elasticities.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates for the final PSTR
Specification Model II Model IV
Threshold Var. EX Growth Debt
Parameter β0 β1 β2 β0 β1 β2 β3
Pop. 2.05
(7.29)
−0.19
(−2.85)
0
(−0.21)
0.16
(0.2)
12330
(1.78)
0.01
(0.17)
−12320
(−1.78)
Open 0.03
(0.26)
0.7
(3.94)
0.37
(3.66)
−1.3
(−0.52)
16080
(0.76)
1.22
(2.93)
−16080
(−0.76)
Debt −0.05
(−5.39)
0.04
(3.32)
0.03
(2.64)
−17.05
(−6.28)
35990
(4.25)
−0.51
(−1.67)
−35810
(−4.25)
EX Growth 0.03
(1.47)
−0.04
(−1.11)
−0.02
(−0.91)
0.16
(0.81)
−1180
(−0.68)
0
(0.06)
1180
(0.68)
Pl deviation −0.45
(−1.15)
1.28
(1.98)
1.33
(3.03)
5.76
(0.84)
−33070
(−0.55)
0.98
(0.96)
33010
(0.55)
K account 0.8
(6.64)
−0.23
(−1.26)
−0.29
(−2.36)
4.31
(1.78)
−26460
(−1.26)
0.39
(1.21)
26420
(1.26)
TOT 0.39
(2.41)
0.18
(0.65)
−0.23
(−1.65)
−9.7
(−2.82)
112730
(3.64)
−0.59
(−1.02)
−112640
(−3.64)
Location parameter c -0.81 5.17 0.60 2.44 0.60
Slope parameter γ -6.19×105 8136 0.29 703 0.29
Schwartz Criterion -1.26 -1.29
Notes: The T-statistique in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. For each transition function, the estimated
location parameters c and the corresponding estimated slope parameter γ are reported. The PSTR parameters can not be
directly interpreted as elasticities.
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Figure 1: Transition Function with c=0. Sensivity Analysis to the Slope
Parameter γ
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Figure 2: Estimated Coefficient of the PSTR specification
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Notes : the missing graphs correspond to cases where the threshold variable has no significant effect on the
coefficient at ten percent level. Model I: PL. Dev, Model II: Export Growth, Model III: K account, Model
IV: Debt, Model VI and VII: US macro 2 (Savings), US macro 3 (RIR). In model I to IV ∗ denotes China
in 2003, △ Hungary in 2003, ♦ Brazil in 2003 and o Morocco in 2003. In model VI and VII ∗ denotes year
1980, △ year 1991, ♦ year 2000 and o year 2003.
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Figure 3: Estimated Coefficient of the PSTR specification
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Notes : the missing graphs correspond to cases where the threshold variable has no significant effect on the
coefficient at ten percent level. Model I: PL. Dev, Model II: Export Growth, Model III: K account, Model
IV: Debt, Model VI and VII: US macro 2 (Savings), US macro 3 (RIR). In model I to IV ∗ denotes China
in 2003, △ Hungary in 2003, ♦ Brazil in 2003 and o Morocco in 2003. In model VI and VII ∗ denotes year
1980, △ year 1991, ♦ year 2000 and o year 2003.
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